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This chapter considers the principles underlying the design and implementation of 
early warning indicators. We argue that indicators based on quantities—especially 
balance sheet aggregates—are most likely to yield indicators that issue warning sig-
nals well before vulnerabilities have grown too large for policy makers to control. 
As shown in Chap. 2, during the first phase of global liquidity, noncore liabilities 
of financial intermediaries were most likely to yield timely signals—as banks were 
center stage in intermediating credit growth. The second phase of global liquidity 
pivoted on the behavior of capital markets, so the behavior of fund managers should 
be reflected in the indicator. When credit growth is driven by corporate bond issu-
ance by nonfinancial borrowers, aggregate issuance by corporates would be a useful 
indicator. In addition, if corporate borrowers engage in “carry trades” by borrowing 
in foreign currency (FCY) while holding the proceeds of corporate bond issuance 
in local currency financial instruments and deposits, then tracking the aggregate 
cash holdings of corporates would also yield useful information.
3.1  Principles for Selection of Early Warning Indicators
Finding a set of early warning indicators that can signal vulnerability to financial 
turmoil has always been a policy priority in emerging economies. In the aftermath 
of the global financial crisis, however, it has also become a paramount policy goal 
for advanced economies. There is ample literature on early warning indicators for 
financial crises, well described in a recent International Monetary Fund (IMF) sur-
vey (Chamon and Crowe 2012). Crises in emerging economies during the 1990s 
ignited much of the work. For example, in their overview of the literature as of 
1998, Kaminsky et al. (1998) catalogued 105 variables that had been used until 
then. But the search deepened in the aftermath of the global financial crisis.
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Here, we review the principles behind the selection of early warning indica-
tors based on Shin (2013). The conventional approach was to distinguish between 
crises in emerging economies from those in advanced economies—with a differ-
ent set of variables for each group. For example, emerging economy crises focus 
on capital flow reversals associated with “sudden stops,” where variables such as 
external borrowings denominated in FCY take center stage. For advanced econo-
mies, housing booms and household leverage were more important. This distinc-
tion is also reflected in the work of official multilateral institutions. The IMF has 
added a new vulnerability exercise for advanced economies (VEA) to an existing 
vulnerability exercise for emerging economies (VEE), which both feed into a joint 
early warning exercise with the Financial Stability Board (FSB).
Although the split between emerging and advanced economies helps improve 
the “goodness of fit,” it tends to obscure common threads underlying both types 
of crises. Capital flow reversals in Spain and Ireland during the Eurozone crisis 
mimic many features of a “sudden stop,” except that private sector fund outflows 
have been compensated for by the inflow of official funds. However, since the 
Eurozone crisis occurred in a common currency area, the traditional classification 
of emerging market “currency crises”—where currency movements play a key 
role—does not fit easily in an empirical exercise.
Given the common threads that tie together apparently disparate crises, it is 
useful to step back from the practical imperative of maximizing goodness of fit 
and instead consider the conceptual underpinnings of early warning models. The 
guiding theme here is that the procyclicality of the financial system provides an 
organizing framework for selecting vulnerability indicators, especially those asso-
ciated with banks and financial intermediaries more generally.
To set the stage for our study, we consider the three broad sets of indicators for 
early warning purposes and assess their relative likelihood of success.
i. Indicators based on market prices, such as credit default swap (CDS) spreads, 
implied volatility, and other price-based measures of default or distress;
ii. Gap measures of the credit-to-GDP ratio; and
iii. Banking sector liability aggregates, including monetary aggregates.
The first approach (based on market prices) seems most appropriate for obtaining 
indicators of concurrent market conditions. But it is less useful in identifying early 
warning indicators with enough lead time for meaningful remedial action. The 
credit-to-GDP gap measure is a distinct improvement from the first. It boasts good 
pedigree from the work of economists at the Bank for International Settlements 
(BIS). And it has been explored extensively as part of the Basel III bank capital 
rules. However, some authors raise questions on the real-time properties of the 
credit-to-GDP measure.
The third approach—based on bank liability aggregates—rests on the same 
principles as credit measures. To the extent measures of bank liabilities also con-
vey information on the size of consolidated bank balance sheets, they may be use-
ful as a measure of financial vulnerability. As a measurement exercise, the balance 
sheet of the entire banking sector can be measured either in terms of assets or in 
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terms of liabilities, which may show different dynamics from the interest rates 
that most research tracks. Nevertheless, bank liabilities tend to be more transpar-
ent and homogenous than bank assets. Liabilities tend to be short term—mainly in 
the form of deposits—and hence, their book values are close to marked-to-market 
values. In addition, liabilities are more easily organized into core and noncore lia-
bilities with contrasting cyclical properties. Noncore liabilities exhibit greater pro-
cyclicality, so the ratio of noncore to core liabilities provides useful information as 
an early warning indicator of financial vulnerability (Hahm et al. 2013).
One consequence of the monetary approach is that any measure derived this 
way will need to fit the specific institutional features of the financial system, rather 
than being applied universally in an unthinking way. These institutional details 
turn out to matter quite a lot. So for example, the People’s Republic of China 
would need to heed quite different details of its financial system than, say, the 
Republic of Korea, which has a more open banking sector. One of the tasks is to 
set out a broader conceptual framework that allows us to encompass the different 
cases and to lay out the principles for when indicators should be used and under 
what circumstances.
Along with heeding institutional differences, we also need to transcend tra-
ditional thinking behind the definitions of monetary aggregates to make the 
approach useful. Whereas traditional definitions of monetary aggregates exclude 
liabilities between financial intermediaries, liability aggregates are perhaps the 
most informative of them all.
Before exploring the attributes of bank liability aggregates, we first discuss the 
relative merits of the three approaches to early warning indicators mentioned above.
Figure 3.1 shows the CDS spreads of Bears Stearns and Lehman Brothers, with 
the right-hand panel giving the longer term perspective and illustrating how these 
spreads increased sharply with the onset of the crisis.
It is remarkable how tranquil the CDS measure was before the crisis. There was 
barely a ripple in the series between 2004 and 2006, when vulnerability to finan-
cial crisis was building. The left-hand panel plots the CDS series for the precrisis 
period between January 2004 and January 2007. It shows that CDS spreads were 
























































































Bear Stearns Lehman Brothers
Fig. 3.1  Credit default swap (CDS) spreads for Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers. Note Left 
panel 2004–2006, Right panel 2004–2008. Source Bankscope
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actually falling, dipping below 20 basis points at the end of 2006. Other price-
based measures, such as value-at-risk, implied volatility; structural models of 
default based on equity prices, among others, all paint the same picture.
The failure of price-based measures as early warning indicators can be traced 
to the implicit premise that market signals and decisions guided by those signals 
always interact in a stabilizing virtuous circle. Rather, they sometimes go astray 
and act together to amplify a vicious circle instead, where market signals and deci-
sions made reinforce an existing tendency toward procyclicality.
To illustrate this, a scatter chart plots how much the change in balance sheet 
size of Barclays—a typical global bank—is financed through equity and how 
much through debt (Fig. 3.2). It also shows how risk-weighted assets changed as 
the balance sheet grows or shrinks.
The fact that risk-weighted assets barely increase—even as raw assets are 
increasing rapidly—is indicative of how measured risks (such as spreads or value-
at-risk measures) move lower during lending booms. Lower measured risks and 
lending booms thus go together. The reverse causation also holds—the compres-
sion of risk spreads is induced by the rapid increase in credit supply chasing avail-
able credit. This two-way causation builds a feedback loop in which greater credit 
supply and the compression of spreads feed off one another.
This amplified procyclicality poses hard challenges for traditional thinking that 
puts faith in market discipline as an integral part of financial regulation—where 
prices are relied on to issue timely warning signals.
Indeed, market discipline was one of the three “Pillars” of Basel II. Economists 
associated with the Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee were influential here. 
Calomiris (1999) argued for rules requiring banks to maintain a minimum amount 
of subordinated debt, the rationale being that banks that take on excessive risk find 
it difficult to sell their subordinated debt. Thus, they will be forced to shrink risky 
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Fig. 3.2  Changes in assets versus changes in debt, equity, and risk-weighted assets of Barclays 
(1992–2010). Source Bankscope
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assets or issue new equity to comply with the discipline imposed by private unin-
sured creditors. However, the run-up to the recent crisis showed just how market 
risk premiums erode so as to nullify market discipline.
Larry Summers’s quip (Summers 1985) that finance researchers need to show 
that “two-quart bottles of ketchup invariably sell for twice as much as one-quart 
bottle of ketchup” is related to the reason why price-based measures of early warn-
ing indicators will likely fail. Absence of arbitrage means that prices at a point in 
time are consistent, but they are liable to flip into distress mode (again, fully con-
sistent across assets) with the onset of a crisis. If the task is to give prior warning 
of the onset of a crisis, price-based measures have little to say.
As the start of a crisis is often accompanied by a panicked run to the exits, 
the switch from a benign environment to a hostile one can be precipitous indeed. 
Global games literature illustrates how the transition into financial distress—the 
“tipping point”—is associated with self-reinforcing effects between individual 
constraints and market outcomes; how the onset of a crisis is triggered by appar-
ently small changes in underlying fundamentals. Outwardly, the switch into cri-
sis is almost self-fulfilling. Goldstein (2010) discusses how empirical research 
should take account of tipping points and shows how the global games framework 
(Morris and Shin 1998, 2001, 2008) is useful in a modeling exercise.
Market prices have been useful for early warning exercises precisely when the 
market price of risk is too low, rather than too high. Thus, it is when asset prices 
are too high relative to some benchmark that warnings are appropriate.
In their 2005 paper on the US housing market, Himmelberg et al. (2005) argued 
that a high price-to-rent ratio or high price-to-income ratio need not predicate a 
housing bubble—as discount rates implied by low long-term interest rates had also 
fallen. But as discount rates are prices, the combination of low discount rates and 
high housing prices is arguably the kind of point-in-time consistency in prices that 
Summers (1985) had in mind.
Under Basel III, the ratio of credit to GDP takes a central role as the basis for 
the countercyclical capital buffer. As shown by Borio and Lowe (2002, 2004), 
this ratio is useful as an indicator of the stage of the financial cycle. To the extent 
procyclicality drives financial vulnerability, detecting excessive credit growth 
is central. Normalizing credit to some underlying fundamental measure such as 
GDP—and detecting deviations from trend—would be one way to operationalize 
the notion of excessive credit growth.
However, although a credit boom is clear with hindsight, there are several chal-
lenges in using the deviation from trend of credit-to-GDP ratios as an early warn-
ing indicator in real time.
The first is the difficulty of estimating the trend that serves as benchmark 
for what is considered “excessive” growth. The difficulty is not unique to the 
credit-to-GDP ratio—it is shared by other macroeconomic time series. Edge and 
Meisenzahl (2011) find that ex post revisions to the credit-to-GDP ratio gap in real 
time are sizable for the US and as large as the gap itself. The source of the ex post 
revisions is not the revision of underlying data, but rather from the revision of the 
estimated trend measured in real time.
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The second difficulty is that credit growth and GDP dance to somewhat dif-
ferent tunes over the cycle, so that the ratio of the two may sometimes issue 
misleading signals. Bank lending in particular may be influenced by preexisting 
contractual commitments, such as lines of credit, which are drawn down during a 
crisis. Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) document the impact of lines of credit on 
credit growth during the recent crisis. Therefore, lending may continue to increase 
for some time after the onset of the crisis.
Repullo and Saurina (2011) show the credit-to-GDP ratio for the UK and its 
Hodrick–Prescott (HP)-filtered trend (Fig. 3.3). The HP filter parameter is set at 
λ = 400,000 as recommended by the Basel Committee, which effectively means 
a linear trend. The bottom panel shows the credit-to-GDP ratio “gap” between the 
credit-to-GDP ratio and the trend.
Fig. 3.3  Credit-to-GDP ratio and GDP growth—UK. GDP gross domestic product. Note Top 
panel shows UK credit-to-GDP ratio and its time trend (HP filter λ = 40,000), bottom panel 
shows credit-to-GDP gap and GDP growth. Source Repullo and Saurina (2011)
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From the bottom panel, we note the gap measure is large even as GDP growth 
is falling sharply during the crisis. Thus, the ratio of the two gives a misleadingly 
large credit-to-GDP ratio during the crisis.
Basel III discussions give much prominence to the credit-to-GDP gap measure 
(BCBS 2009, 2010). To the extent the Basel rules are expected to be applied uni-
formly (or at least consistently), finding common thresholds for the credit-to-GDP 
ratio would be a basic requirement if Basel III is to apply uniformly to all Basel 
Committee member countries.
3.2  Core and Noncore Liabilities
In addressing financial system procyclicality, it is useful to distinguish between 
banks’ core and noncore liabilities. Core liabilities are the funds banks draw on 
during normal times and are sourced (in the main) domestically. What consti-
tutes core funding depends on the context and the economy in question, but retail 
household deposits would be a good first conjecture in defining core liabilities.
When bank assets grow rapidly, the core funding available will likely be insuf-
ficient to finance the rapid credit growth. This is because retail deposits grow in 
line with the aggregate wealth of households. In a lending boom, when credit is 
growing very rapidly, the pool of retail deposits will likely be insufficient to fund 
growth in bank credit. Other sources must be tapped. The state of the financial 
cycle is thus reflected in the composition of bank liabilities.
Banks’ procyclical behavior has consequences for capital flows. Banks are 
intermediaries that borrow in order to lend, and they must raise funding in order to 
lend to their borrowers. When credit is expanding rapidly, outstripping the pool of 
available retail deposits, the bank will turn to other sources of funding to support 
credit growth, typically from other banks operating as wholesale lenders in the 
capital market. Here, there are close parallels between currency crises and credit 
crises. The link comes from the fact that the procyclical behavior of banks fueling 
the credit boom is financed through capital inflows entering via the banking sector. 
Indeed, one of the key results of our empirical investigation below is that the most 
consistently reliable indicator of vulnerability for both currency and credit crises is 
a high level of foreign bank liabilities.
By addressing the up-phase of the financial cycle—and the potential for the 
compression of risk premiums during lending booms—our approach differs from 
models of leverage constraints or collateral constraints that bind only during the 
downturn. In these models, lending is always below the first best. As well as the 
downturn, our focus is on the up-phase of the cycle when risk premiums become 
compressed, leaving the economy vulnerable to a potential reversal.
Figure 3.4 is a schematic illustration of the buildup of vulnerabilities associ-
ated with the growth of noncore liabilities. The bottom panel is the banking sector 
before a credit boom, while the top panel illustrates the system after the boom. 
As traditional deposit funding does not keep up with credit growth, the banking 
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sector’s expansion is funded by noncore liabilities (in this case, from foreign cred-
itors), building vulnerabilities to foreign creditor deleveraging.
Two features distinguish noncore liabilities. First, they include claims held by 
intermediaries on other intermediaries. And second, they include liabilities to for-
eign creditors, who are typically global banks, and hence also intermediaries, if 
foreign ones. Even for liabilities to domestic creditors, if the creditor is another 
intermediary, the claim tends to be short term. The distinction between core and 
noncore liabilities becomes meaningful once there are differences in the empirical 
properties of the two types of liabilities.
Where the line between core and noncore liabilities lies depends very much on the 
financial system in question, its degree of openness, and stage of financial market and 
institutional development. For a developed financial system, as in the US or western 
Europe, the distinction between core and noncore liabilities seems reasonably well 
captured by the distinction between deposit versus nondeposit funding. Figure 3.5, 
taken from Shin (2009), shows the composition of the liabilities of Northern Rock, 
the UK bank whose failure in 2007 heralded the global financial crisis.
In the 9 years from 1998 to 2007, Northern Rock’s lending increased 6.5 times. 
This increase in lending far outstripped funds raised through retail deposits, with 
the rest of the funding gap filled by wholesale funding.
The Northern Rock case illustrates a general lesson—that during a credit boom, 
the rapid increase in bank lending outstrips the core deposit funding available to a 
bank. As the boom progresses, the bank resorts to alternative, noncore liabilities 
to finance lending. Therefore, the proportion of noncore bank liabilities serves as 
a useful indicator of the stage of the financial cycle and the degree of vulnerability 
of the banking system to a downturn in that cycle.
For emerging or developing economies, including those in Asia, more thought 





















Fig. 3.4  Lending boom financed by noncore liabilities. Note Increased lending during a credit 
boom is financed by noncore liabilities. Source Authors’ illustration
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liabilities. In an open emerging economy where the banking system is open to 
funding from global banks, rapid increases in noncore bank liabilities show up 
as capital inflows through increased foreign exchange-denominated banking lia-
bilities. For this reason, foreign exchange-denominated banking liabilities can be 
expected to play a key role in diagnosing potential financial instability.
For the Republic of Korea, Shin and Shin (2010) proposed a definition of 
noncore liabilities as the sum of (i) foreign exchange-denominated bank liabilities; 
(ii) bank debt securities; (iii) promissory notes; (iv) repos; and (v) certificates of 
deposit (CDs). This measure of noncore liabilities is an approximation of “true” 
noncore liabilities defined in our accounting framework above, as the classifica-
tion remains based on financial instruments rather than actual potential claims. For 
instance, bank debt securities such as debentures and CDs can be held by house-
holds, which must be excluded from noncore liabilities.
Figure 3.6 illustrates the situation in the Republic of Korea. The right panel 
plots six categories of noncore bank liabilities taken from Shin and Shin (2010). 
It is notable how the first peak in noncore liabilities coincides with the 1997 crisis. 
After a lull in the early 2000s, noncore liabilities increased rapidly in the run-up to 
the 2008/2009 crisis.
The left panel plots noncore liabilities as a fraction of broad money (M2) and 
highlights the highly procyclical nature of noncore liabilities. There is much vari-
ation in the ratio of noncore liabilities to M2, ranging from around 15 % of M2 to 
a peak of 50 % following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, the height of the 
2008 global financial crisis.
The pronounced procyclicality of the noncore liability series for the Republic 
of Korea should not come as a surprise given what we know (from Chap. 2) about 














































Fig. 3.5  Northern Rock liabilities (1998–2007). Source Northern Rock, annual and interim 
reports, 1998–2007
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supply responses to asset price changes and shifts in measured risk. During a 
credit boom, when measured risks are low and funding from global banks are easy 
to come by, we would expect to see strong credit growth fueled by capital inflows 
into the banking sector, often in foreign exchange.
Figure 3.7 shows how capital flows associated with FCY bank liabilities played 
a key role in the foreign exchange liquidity crisis of 2008 in the Republic of Korea. 
The figure plots and compares capital inflows and outflows for equities and banks.
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Noncore Liabilities of Republic of Korea Banks
Fig. 3.6  Noncore liabilities of banks—Republic of Korea. Note Right panel plots six categories 
of noncore liabilities of Korean banks measured in Korean won. Left Panel plots noncore series 


































Fig. 3.7  Net capital flows of equity and banking sector. Source Shin and Shin (2010)
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During the crisis period in 2008, the equity sector (in light bars) actually 
received net inflows. Contrary to the common misperception that foreign investors 
fleeing the Korean stock market were behind the capital outflows (perpetuated by 
television broadcasts after turbulent trading), net flows in the equity sector were 
positive immediately after the crisis hit.
There are good reasons why equity markets should see net positive flows dur-
ing a crisis. Equity outflows are mitigated two ways. During a crisis, not only do 
stock prices fall sharply, but there is a steep local currency depreciation relative 
to the US dollar. For both reasons, foreign investors suffer a “double whammy” 
if they withdraw. Provided the exchange rate is allowed to adjust, equity outflows 
will not be the main culprit in draining FCY reserves. When Korean investors have 
equity investments abroad, repatriation flows back will outweigh outflows from 
foreign investors.
However, the banking sector is different for three reasons. First, FCY liabili-
ties have a face value that must be met in full. Second, the face value is in FCY. 
And third, the dynamics of deleveraging sets off amplifying effects through price 
changes and shifts in measured risk.
For all three reasons, bank deleveraging is associated with precipitous capital 
outflows. Unlike long-term investors such as pension funds, mutual funds, and life 
insurance companies, leveraged institutions are vulnerable to the erosion of capi-
tal and hence substantially adjust their assets even when small shocks strike. The 
feedback loop generated by these reactions to price changes amplifies the shock.
As Fig. 3.7 shows, the banking sector in the Republic of Korea saw very sub-
stantial capital outflows in the aftermath of the crisis. In the three months after 
the Lehman bankruptcy, banking sector outflows reached $49 billion, which 
more than accounts for the decrease in the Republic of Korea’s foreign exchange 
reserves—from over $240 billion before the Lehman crisis to $200 billion by the 
end of 2008. Bank deleveraging and the associated amplification effects figure 
prominently in emerging economy financial crises.
The sequencing of reforms matters as well. If liberalization of nonfinancial cor-
porate funding proceeds ahead of bank liberalization—as was the case in Japan 
during the 1980s—it becomes profitable for large manufacturers to recycle liquid-
ity and act as de facto financial intermediaries. They do this by raising funds in 
capital markets through securities and then depositing the funds in bank time 
deposits. This can dramatically increase the financial assets of nonfinancial corpo-
rations, along with their financial liabilities (Hattori et al. 2009). Figure 3.8 illus-
trates the change in financial structure that this liquidity recycling entails. When 
nonfinancial firms act as de facto financial intermediaries, M2 will rise rapidly due 
to increasing deposit claims on banks. Meanwhile, banks themselves will be under 
increasing pressure to find new borrowers—as one of their traditional customers 
(manufacturing firms) no longer needs funding. Instead, banks and manufacturing 
firms undergo a role reversal, with firms making deposits with banks rather than 
seeking loans.
When this happens, the distinction between core and noncore bank liabilities 
does not neatly coincide with the distinction between deposit and nondeposit 
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liabilities. In many developing economies at an early stage of financial develop-
ment, or in those generally closed to the global banking system, the principle 
behind the distinction is better expressed as the distinction between retail house-
hold deposits and the wholesale deposits of nonfinancial companies.
In practice, however, classifying core and noncore liabilities is not so clear-cut. 
For small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) with an owner-manager, bank 
deposits can be seen as household deposits. On the other hand, a firm could have 
access to market finance and the ability to issue bonds—depositing the proceeds in 
banks. This is what happened in Japan in the 1980s, for instance. This latter case 
should not be counted as a core liability as the creditor firm is acting like an inter-
mediary borrowing from financial markets to lend to banks.
Thus, what is considered core or noncore will depend on an economy’s finan-
cial system and its institutions. For economies with banks operating in developed, 
open capital markets, noncore funding will typically take the form of wholesale bank 
funding from capital markets, sometimes denominated in FCY. However, if the econ-
omy has a closed capital account with banks prevented from accessing foreign capi-
tal market funding, then what is considered noncore funding could be quite different.
A comparison between the PRC and the Republic of Korea helps illustrate this 
point. Figure 3.9 plots the monthly growth rates of various banking sector liability 
aggregates for the Republic of Korea (left panel) and the PRC (right panel). The 
growth rates have been filtered through an HP filter at business cycle frequency. 
The HP filter is used here with hindsight to highlight differences in time series pat-
terns, as opposed to the real-time, trend-finding exercise under Basel III.
In the Republic of Korea, banks have access to capital markets, either directly 
or through the foreign bank branches operating in the economy. For this reason, 
the most procyclical components of bank liability aggregates are those associated 
with wholesale funding, especially the series for FCY-denominated bank liabili-
ties. The other noncore liabilities are bank debentures, repos, and other nondeposit 
items such as promissory notes (Shin and Shin 2010). Before the 1997/1998 Asian 
financial crisis and the global financial crisis, noncore liabilities grew rapidly, only 
to crash when each crisis begins. In contrast, the growth of M2, reflecting house-
hold and corporate deposits, varies much less over the cycle.
Fig. 3.8  Structural changes 



















The right panel of Fig. 3.9 shows that in the PRC, the M2 subcomponents 
exhibit considerable variation in time series properties. For an economy such as 
the PRC, where banks are prevented from accessing international capital markets, 
applying the same core and noncore liability classifications as in the Republic of 
Korea would be inappropriate.
More thought is needed on how financial conditions are transmitted across 
PRC’s border. As mentioned above, just as water finds cracks to flow through, 
even a closed financial system is not entirely immune to global financial condi-
tions. This is especially true for a highly trade-dependent economy such as the 
PRC. If banks are prevented from accessing international capital markets, then 
nonfinancial firms will act as conduit for transmitting financial conditions.
Similar to Fig. 2.16, Fig. 3.10 depicts the activities of a PRC nonfinancial firm 
with operations outside the country: one that borrows in US dollars from an inter-
national bank in Hong Kong, China, and posts renminbi deposits as collateral. The 
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Fig. 3.9  Monthly growth rates of HP-filtered bank liability aggregates—People’s Republic of 


















RMB deposit as collateral for USD loan
Fig. 3.10  Borrowing relationship structure among nonfinancial corporates in the People’s 
Republic of China. A assets; L liabilities, Source Authors’ illustration
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decided at the outset. As mentioned earlier, the transactions instead resemble the 
operation of the old London Eurodollar market in the 1960s and 1970s. For the 
PRC firm, the purpose of having US dollar liabilities and holding the proceeds in 
renminbi may be to hedge export receivables or simply to speculate on renminbi 
appreciation.
Figure 3.11 provides the evidence for the transactions depicted in Fig. 3.9, plot-
ting the FCY claims and liabilities of banks in Hong Kong, China, to customers in 
the PRC. In this case, the FCY would be (mainly) US dollars for assets and (mainly) 
renminbi for liabilities. Both have risen dramatically in recent years, reflecting the 
rapidly rising amount of US dollar funding available to nonfinancial corporates.
The procyclical pattern in corporate deposits visible in the right panel in 
Fig. 3.9 may be due to these activities among nonfinancial corporates. In addition, 
they may also explain why the PRC has seen dollar shortages when global fund-
ing markets deteriorated due to the Eurozone crisis. Then, the renminbi was under 
pressure and depreciated against the US dollar. Although the PRC banking system 
is largely closed, global activities of its nonfinancial firms are reflected in the cor-
porate deposits within M2, when these firms hold the proceeds of US dollar liabili-
ties in their PRC accounts.
Figure 3.12 illustrates the growth in the component of PRC money stock coming 
from corporate deposits rather than households. The left panel shows the time trend 
in personal deposits and corporate deposits, while the right panel shows the ratio of 
corporate to personal deposits. In recent years, there was an increase in the propor-
tion of corporate deposits, which is consistent with the operations of PRC corporates.
The excess liquidity generated by nonfinancial corporate activity in the PRC 
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Fig. 3.11  Claims and liabilities of banks in Hong Kong, China, to nonbank customers in the 
People’s Republic of China. PRC People’s Republic of China, FCY foreign currency. Source 
Hong Kong Monetary Authority
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in Japan in the 1980s following the financial liberalization that allowed Japanese 
companies to access global capital markets. Both in Japan in the 1980s and 
in the PRC more recently, monetary aggregates, especially corporate deposits, 
played the role of noncore liabilities in the way FCY borrowing by Korean banks 
played the role of noncore liabilities in the Republic of Korea. The point of contact 
between FCY liabilities in the Republic of Korea and the corporate deposits in the 
PRC is that both are bank liabilities.
This points to a broader theme of financialization of nonfinancial companies, 
where these firms take on attributes of financial firms by increasing the size of their 
balance sheets relative to their sales-generating activities. As a consequence, they help 
amplify financial cycles. Therefore, as monetary policy moves from the role of banks 
to the functioning of bond markets and the availability of credit to borrowers from 
long-term investors—such as asset managers acting on behalf of pension funds and 

















































































Fig. 3.12  Components of the monetary aggregates—People’s Republic of China. Source 
People’s Bank of China
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